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Auditor
Independence
A Problem to the Profession and the
Public___________________________
By Charles E. Jordan and James G. Johnston
An auditor examines a set of finan
cial statements in order to form an
opinion on those financial state
ments and expresses this opinion in
an audit report. The primary bene
ficiaries of an audit report are thirdparty financial statement users. Un
less auditors are independent of their
clients and their clients’ financial
statements, however, audit reports
will be of little use. This article pro
vides an examination of some of the
problems currently facing auditors
and their independence.
The auditing profession’s stan
dards recognize two types of inde
pendence that must be maintained.
The first type is known as indepen
dence in fact and relates to auditors’
intellectual honesty. Independence
in fact means that auditors approach
all matters concerning an audit exam

ination with complete objectivity. It
also means that auditors must not
subordinate their judgment to oth
ers.
The second type of independence
identified by professional standards
is known as independence in appear
ance. Since auditors’ opinions are
relied upon by third-party financial
statement users, auditors must be
perceived as being independent. Au
ditors must avoid situations that
might lead others to believe that
objectivity has been impaired. But
maintaining an appearance of inde
pendence is almost an impossible
task.

On Trial: Independence
in Appearance
Imagine that a CPA firm in on trial

Characters in the scenario are (from left to right): the judge (you, the
reader); C. P. Akins, managing partner in the defendant CPA firm; I. M.
Slick, attorney for the defense; one of the plaintiffs (an unidentified
creditor of Client Co.); Fred D. Fastalk, attorney for the plaintiffs.

for losing its appearance of inde
pendence. Fortunately, CPA firms
never find themselves being sued
simply because they do not appear
independent, but this is a good way
of exemplifying the problems that
plague a firm’s independence in ap
pearance. The defendant in our
make-believe trial is Smith, Jones &
Co. (SJ), a highly reputable CPA
firm. The plaintiffs are the stock
holders and creditors of Client Co.,
one of SJ’s audit clients. The plain
tiffs are suing SJ because they feel
that the defendant is no longer capa
ble of making objective decisions
concerning the examination of Cli
ent Co.’s financial statements. As
sumethe scenario includes the char
acters identified in the illustration
on this page.
With an air of confidence, the
defense attorney calls only one wit
ness, C. P. Akins. The questioning of
this witness proceeds as follows:
I. M. Slick: “Mr. Akins, would you
please state your firm’s relation
ship with Client Co.”
C. P. Akins: “We are Client Co.’s
external auditor. Weexaminetheir
financial statements and provide
an audit opinion concerning the
fair presentation of those finan
cial statements in conformity with
generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP).”
Slick: “Does your CPA firm set forth
this GAAP?”
Akins: “No, GAAP is promulgated
by the Financial Accounting Stan
dards Board (FASB). As an audit
ing firm, we simply provide rea
sonable assurance that Client Co.
has not materially deviated from
GAAP.”
Slick: “Have you ever had any dis
agreements with the management
of Client Co. concerning the prop
er application of GAAP?”
Akins: “Oh, yes. Disagreements are
not uncommon, but we (SJ) never
subordinate our judgment to that
of the client. We have our profes
sional reputation and integrity to
think of, you know.”
Slick: “As far as your audit of Client
Co. is concerned, to whom is your
ultimate responsibility owed?”
Akins: “As with any audit engage
ment, our ultimate responsibility
is owed to the financial statement
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users, Client Co.’s investors and
creditors. Without these thirdparty users, there would be no
need for an audit engagement.”
Slick: “Do you or any of the other
partners and employees of your
firm own stock or other types of
financial investments in Client
Co.?”
Akins: “No. The auditing profes
sion’s code of ethics does not
allow us to own financial interests
in the firms we audit. Furthermore,
none of our employees who work
on the Client Co. engagement
haveclose relatives holding influen
tial positions within Client Co.”
Slick: “Do any of your employees or
fellow partners of SJ make managerial-type decisions for Client
Co.?”
Akins: “No, we do not engage in the
management activities of Client
Co. If we notice inefficiencies in
Client Co.’s accounting system,
we do provide recommendations
and advice for improvement, but
the decision to implement the im
provements rests with Client Co.’s
own management.”
Slick: “I have only one more ques
tion for you, Mr. Akins. Before
now, has your firm ever been sued
for lack of independence?”
Akins: “No. As a matter of fact, we
have never been sued for any
thing, until now. As with most
CPA firms, our most prized pos
session is our integrity. This integ
rity keeps us honest and inde
pendent in all our dealings with
Client Co.”
Slick: “Before turning Mr. Akins over
to Mr. Fastalk for cross-examina
tion, I would like to make a few
summary remarks to the jury. Mr.
Akins contends that his firm does
not owe its ultimate responsibility
to Client Co. Furthermore, no one
associated with SJ owns a finan
cial interest in or makes manager
ial decisions for Client Co. All
employees and partners associat
ed with SJ are professionals and
are above reproach. There is no
reason to doubt SJ’s indepen
dence with respect to its examina
tion of Client Co.’s financial state
ments.”
With C. P. Akins still under oath, it
is time for the prosecuting attorney,
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Fred D. Fastalk, to cross-examine
the witness.
Fastalk: “Before questioning the wit
ness, I would like to remind the
jury that SJ’s independence, in
fact, is not on trial here. We are
concerned only with its appear
ance of independence. The issues
I raise will be directed toward
proving that SJ does not appear
independent to an investor or cred
itor.”
Fastalk: [Addressing C. P. Akins]
“You stated earlier that your firm’s
ultimate responsibility is to thirdparty financial statement users.
Did these third-party users hire
you to perform the audit of Client
Co.?”
Akins: “No, we were hired by Client
Co.”
Fastalk: “I see, and who pays your
fees when you examine Client
Co.’s financial statements?”
Akins: “Client Co. pays our fees.”
Fastalk: “In terms of total fees gen
erated, is Client Co. an important
client of SJ?”
Akins: “Well, yes. Client Co. is our
firm’s second largest audit client.”
Fastalk: “Approximately what per
centage of your firm’s total fees
earned each year are attributable
to the services performed for Cli
ent Co.?”
Akins: “That is difficult to say for
sure, but the revenue generated
by the Client Co. engagement is
probably around 5 percent of our
total revenue.”
Fastalk: “Can Client Co. terminate
the engagement and seek the ser
vices of another CPA firm if it so
desires?”
Akins: “Yes, of course it can.”
Fastalk: “Mr. Akins, yourfirm’s rela
tionship with Client Co. seems to
create an ironic situation. How
can you expect an investor or
creditor to believe that you are
independent and objective with
respect to Client Co. when your
firm’s very livelihood depends up
on the fees paid by Client Co. and
others like it?”
Akins: “Well, as I stated earlier, we
are professionals. Our integrity
keeps us independent. Outsiders
must have faith in our integrity.”
Fastalk: “Does your firm perform

services for Client Co. other than
your annual examination of their
financial statements?”
Akins: “Yes, we also provide tax
servicesand management consult
ing services for Client Co.”
Fastalk: “In providing tax services,
just exactly what does your firm
do for Client Co.?”
Akins: “We do, of course, prepare
Client Co.’s tax return. Inso doing,
our primary responsibility is the
legal minimization of Client Co.’s
income taxes. We also represent
Client Co. in tax audits and other
proceedings conducted by the
IRS.”
Fastalk: “This is quite interesting.
Your firm is a strict advocate of
Client Co. when providing tax
services, but when you audit Cli
ent Co.’s financial statements, you
are completely independent and
objective. Is this a correct state
ment?”
Akins: “Yes, that is correct.”
Fastalk: “Mr. Akins, could you give
us an example of the type of man
agement consulting services your
firm provides for Client Co.?”
Akins: “Yes, that will be easy. We at
SJ pride ourselves on being a
multi-talented CPA firm. We have
provided consulting services to
Client Co. on numerous occa
sions. For example, three years
ago Client Co. decided to switch
from a manual periodic inventory
system to a computerized perpetu
al inventory system. SJ was en
gaged as a consultant for this
transition. We studied the situa
tion and recommended the com
puter hardware and software and
accounting controls we felt would
be best for Client Co.”
Fastalk: “Mr. Akins, I am confused
again. When you audit Client Co.’s
financial statements, does this in
clude an examination of Client
Co.’s inventory system?”
Akins: “Yes, we do examine their
inventory system. Inventory
makes up a major portion of Client
Co.’s total assets.”
Fastalk: “How is it that your firm can
be independent and objective
when you are evaluating a system
that was implemented based upon
yourfirm’s recommendation? This
seems like a direct conflict of

interest. It appears as though you
are auditing your own firm’s
work.”
Akins: “No, we are not auditing our
own work. When we recommend
ed the inventory system, we were
working strictly in an advisory
capacity. It was Client Co.’s man
agement who actually decided to
implement the inventory system.
When auditing the inventory sys
tem, we are trying to determine if
Client Co. is using the system
properly. Thus, we are perform
ing two completely different roles
for Client Co.”
Fastalk: “Thank you, Mr. Akins. I
have nofurtherquestions. I would
now like to make my closing re
marks to the jury. Ladiesand gen
tlemen of the jury, the task before
you is to decide if sufficient evi
dence has been presented to indi
cate that Mr. Akins’ CPA firm’s
independence in appearance has
been impaired.
“The fee relationship that exists
between Client Co. and its CPA
firm seems to negate the latter’s
appearance of independence. The
non audit services provided by
the CPA firm also tend to impair
the firm’s independence. Any pru
dent investor or creditor must ques
tion a CPA firm’s ability to be
independent in one instance and
a strict advocate in another.
“Mr. Akins’ firm may be indepen
dent in fact, but this is not the
issue here. The issue before us is
whether his firm appears indepen
dent. I believethe evidence shown
here today proves that this CPA
firm’s appearance of indepen
dence has indeed been impaired.

A jury of reasonable investors and
creditorscould, very easily, find that
Smith, Jones & Co. is not indepen
dent in appearance. Even though
the participants in this make-believe
trial do not exist, the issues are real.
Because of the nature of the CPA/
client relationships, CPA firms sim
ply do not always appear indepen
dent. Note, however, that these inde
pendence-damaging relationships
are not new. On the one hand, socie
ty has tolerated these relationships
over the years because the ensuing
benefits are considered “necessary
evils.” On the other hand, society
frowns upon the auditing profes

sion’s apparent inability to maintain
its independence in fact.

Independence in Fact
Independence in fact means that
an auditor’s decisions should be
made objectively, free and clear of
any influence that other parties or
factors might bring to bear. Since
independence in fact deals with intel
lectual honesty, its existence is dif
ficult to prove or disprove. Yet, cur
rently there are certain conditions
that would seem to create a gray
area where independence in fact is
involved.

The auditing

profession’s standards
recognize two types of
independence that must
be maintained.
For example, competition among
CPA firms has increased dramati
cally in the last few years. Increased
competition is the result of, primar
ily, the sanctioning of competitive
bidding by the AICPA, a decrease in
profits due to skyrocketing malprac
tice insurance rates, and a shrinking
pool of clients due to numerous
corporate mergers. The current com
petitive environment is exemplified
in a statement made by J. Michael
Cook, chairman of Deloitte, Haskins,
& Sells, the nation’s seventh largest
accounting firm. Cook states: “Five
years ago, if a client of another firm
came to me and complained about
the service, I’d immediately warn the
other firm’s chief executive. Today, I
try to take away his client” [Berton,
1985a].
Competition increases the likeli
hood that an auditor will be replaced
by one who is more likely to comply
with the client’s wishes. Knowing
that they can be replaced with rela
tive ease, auditors may approach
controversial issues with impaired
objectivity. Because of this in
creased competition, clients now
have more power over their audi
tors.
This increased competition is forc
ing auditors to hold down theiraudit
fees. To hold down audit fees, audit
engagements are being completed

more quickly, and substandard audit
work may be occurring. As a result
of the need to complete audits more
quickly, auditors currently face in
tense time-budget pressures. To
meet the stringent time budgets,
auditors resort to various practices.
Ibrahim [1986] notes that one such
practice involves signing off on audit
program steps without ever com
pleting the steps. Obviously, such a
procedure results in the reduction of
audit quality. The frequency of such
behavior is impossible to determine,
but a study by Kelly and Seiler [1982]
showed that over 30 percent of the
staff auditors responding to their
survey had performed in such a
manner.
Another problem plaguing audi
tor independence results from audi
tors performing successive audits.
There are benefits derived from long
auditor/client relationships; for one,
auditors do not have to relearn the
client’s accounting system each
year. Thus, auditscan be performed
more efficiently, benefiting both the
auditors and their clients. However,
long auditor/client relationships may
result in auditor complacency. This
problem was summed up in a 1979
Senate Subcommittee report on the
accounting establishment. The re
port stated:
Long association between a corpora
tion and an accounting firm may
lead to such a close identification of
the accounting firm with the inter
ests of its client’s management that
truly independent action by the ac
counting firm becomes difficult [Met
calf Report, 1979].

The Subcommittee recommended
mandatory rotation of auditors at
periodic intervals. Their suggestion
fell on deaf ears, and the problem
still exists today.
Now, several years later, another
Congressional Subcommittee is exam
ining the accounting profession.
Chaired by Representative John Ding
ell, a Democrat from Michigan, the
Subcommittee’s primary concern is
the independence of accountants.
The Subcommittee’s investigative
hearings began in early 1985 and
will not be completed until late 1987
or perhaps 1988. In his opening
remarks, Dingell raised an impor
tant question about auditor indepen
dence. He stated: “When an indepen
dent CPA helps set up a company,
offers it financial and management
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advice, then performs an audit of its
books, questions are raised about
the ability of that accountant to re
main objective in his dealings” [Wil
liams, 1985].
This same issue of performing
nonaudit services was discussed in
an earlier section of this article deal
ing with independence in appear
ance. Dingell’s concern, however,
runs deeper than an accountant’s
appearance of independence. Din

gell and the other members of his
Subcommittee feel that the account
ing profession’s ability to remain
independent in fact may be impaired.
As Michael Barrett, the Subcommit
tee’s chief counsel, stated: “We’re
very concerned that the more hats
an accounting firm wears for its
clients, the more the firm is in the
client’s pocket” [Berton, 1985a].
As mentioned earlier, proving or
disproving an accountant’s indepen

TABLE 1
A Partial Listing of
Problem Audits
CPA Firm Involved
(Year of Audit)

Client Co.

Audit Problems

Arthur Young & Co.
(Early 1960’s-1976)
Frederick McGraw &
Co. (1977-1983)

Bell & Beckwith

Both CPA firms were sued
because neither followed
generally accepted auditing
standards which should
have revealed the misdeeds
of the client’s managing
partner over the years
[Ingersoll and Berton,
1985].

Arthur Andersen
(1968-1970)

Fund of Funds

The CPA firm was sued for
fraud because it failed to
warn its client, Fund of
Funds (FF), that it was
purchasing highly over
valued investments. FF
purchased the assets from
another of AA’s clients. AA
was sued because they had
“knowledge of or recklessly
disregarded” the fraudulent
prices [WSJ Staff, 1981a].

Arthur Andersen
(1969)

Viatron Computer
Systems

The CPA firm failed to
qualify its opinion even
though it was evident that
the client could not raise
enough capital to survive
[WSJ Staff, 1981b].

Ernst & Whinney
(1974)

Franklin National
Bank

The CPA firm was sued by
the FDIC for providing the
bank with a clean opinion
only a short period of time
before the bank failed. The
CPA firm failed to
recognize that the bank’s
reserves were inadequate to
cover bad loans
[Stricharchuk and Darlin,
1982].

(continued)
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dence in fact is almost impossible
because independence in fact deals
with an accountant’s mind-set. Since
mind-reading is out of the question,
the best way to evaluate the account
ing profession’s ability to maintain
independence in fact is to examine
its recent track record. Table 1 con
tainsa partial listing of questionable
audits brought to the public’s atten
tion in the 1980’s.
The listing of questionable audits
in Table 1 is not all-inclusive, but it is
sufficient to show that the account
ing profession is experiencing prob
lems. Note that the circumstances
surrounding the questionable audits
are varied. Some involved personal
greed; others involved a disregard of
professional standards. But no mat
ter what the reason for the problem
audit — increased competition, au
ditor complacency or some other
reason — the end result was a defi
nite lack of independence. The audi
tors failed to make the kind of objec
tive, rational decisions that are ex
pected of prudent auditors.

Si
nce independence in
fact deals with intellectual
honesty, its existence is
difficult to prove
or disprove.
Of course, the important concern
is the pervasiveness of this problem
within the accounting profession.
The AICPA feels that cases likethose
shown in Table 1 are only isolated
occurrences; thus, there is little
cause for alarm. In regard to the
number of problem audits that are
occurring, John W. Zick, chairman
of the AICPA’s SEC practice sec
tion, states: “We are aiming for zero
defects, but we believe the profes
sion’s record is a good one” [News
Report, 1985]. Representative Ding
ell, however, takes quite a different
stand. He states:
The accounting profession tells
us with considerable enthusiasm
that these [problem audits] are only
a microscopic percentage of the
total number of audits, and yet one
of them [ESM Government Securi
ties] was sufficient to bring about

the collapse of the entire state-regu
lated savings and loan industry in
the State of Ohio and was attended
by a significant drop in the value of
the dollar [Williams, 1985].

TABLE 1
A Partial Listing of
Problem Audits
(continued)

Kenneth Leventhal &
Co.
(1974-1975)

Emerson’s Ltd.

The CPA firm was censured
by the SEC for conducting
an audit that was not in
conformity with generally
accepted auditing
standards. The auditors did
not keep detailed working
papers, and they “ignored
warning signals suggesting
a need to probe further into
Emerson’s questionable
accounting practices” [WSJ
Staff, 1981c].

John P. Butler
Accountancy Corp.
(1978)

West Side Mortgage
Co.

The CPA firm was sued for
negligence. Among other
things, the firm failed to
discover that a $100,000
note receivable was
worthless [Berton, 1986b].

Lester Witte & Co.
(1978)

J. B. Lippincott Co.

The SEC censured the CPA
firm because it did not
conduct its examination in
accordance with generally
accepted auditing
standards. The CPA firm
overlooked significant
factors that would have
indicated Lippincott’s
materially misstated
financial statements
[Warner, 1981].

Touche Ross & Co.
(1978-1981)

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co. (1979)

Data Access
Systems

Itel Corp.

Amundsen & Co. (1979) Olympic Oil & Gas
Co.

The client’s assets and
profits were materially
overstated due to improper
accounting methods. The
auditors allegedly knew of
these inaccuracies and
were therefore grossly
negligent and reckless in
performing their duties
[WSJ Staff, 1985a].
The CPA firm gave a clean
opinion even though the
client’s income was
overstated due to
improperly handled
defaulted leases [Drinkhall,
1982].

The CPA firm was sued by
the SEC. Among other
things, the CPA firm gave
Olympic a clean audit
opinion without even
conducting an examination
[WSJ Staff, 1983a].
(continued)

Based on the number of lawsuits
filed against accountants, the public
also believes the problem to be seri
ous. Most of the lawsuits are settled
out of court, with the accounting
firms paying large settlements. For
example, Arthur Andersen & Co.,
the nation’s largest CPA firm, has
had settlements of almost $140 mil
lion since 1980 [Berton, 1985b].
One final point should be made
regarding the extent of the inde
pendence problem. A problem audit
is usually detected only after the
audit client files for bankruptcy. As
long as the client company remains
solvent, the accountant’s work is
rarely scrutinized by persons out
side the profession. This raises a big
question. If this many problem au
dits have been detected, how many
more have gone undetected? Is it
possible that only the tip of the ice
berg has been exposed?

B Based on the number of
lawsuits filed against
accountants, the public
also belie
ves the problem
to be serious.
Summary and Conclusion
An auditor’s opinion has meaning
because the public places confi
dence in the auditor’s ability to make
decisions objectively. There is no
doubt that the accounting profes
sion, as a whole, is comprised of
men and women of high integrity. At
thesametime, however, accountants
arehuman. Becausethey are human,
their audit decisions cannot be made
in a vacuum. Their decisions always
have and always will be affected by a
certain amount of pressure (e.g.,
time-budget pressure and client pres
sure). When this pressure becomes
too great, however, the accountant’s
independence can become im
paired. The number of questionable
audits that have been disclosed in
recent years indicates that perhaps
this pressure point has been reached
quite often.Ω
The Woman CPA, July, 1987/7

REFERENCES

TABLE 1
A Partial Listing of
Problem Audits
(continued)

Ernst & Whinney
(1979-1982)

United American
Bank

The bank collapsed just
three weeks after receiving
a clean opinion from the
CPA firm. Even though
FDIC examiners were at the
bank the same time as E &
W, the accountants did not
talk to the examiners to find
out the status of the FDIC
investigation [Stricharchuk
and Darlin, 1982].

Coopers & Lybrand
(1980)

Security America
Corp.

The CPA firm did not
qualify its opinion even
though the client’s income
was inflated due to
inadequate reserves for
losses on workers’
compensation cases [WSJ
Staff, 1983b].

Ernst & Whinney
(1980)

Dayco Corp.

The CPA firm failed to
detect $120 million in
phony orders for rubber
hoses and belts and $14
million in advance
commissions paid a sales
agent who allegedly placed
the orders [Stricharchuk
and Darlin, 1982].

Price Waterhouse
(1980)

AM International

The SEC sued the CPA firm
because the auditors knew
of, or “but for a conscious
or reckless disregard for the
facts” would have known of,
many instances where the
financial statements were
not in accordance with
GAAP [WSJ Staff, 1985b].

Alexander Grant & Co.
(1980-1983)

ESM Government
Securities

A CPA firm partner
accepted personal
payments totaling $125,000
from officers of the client
company. In return, even
though the client was
insolvent, clean audit
opinions were given on the
client's financial statements
from 1980-1983 [Brannigan,
1985].

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co. (1981)

Penn Square Bank

Along with officers of the
bank, the CPA firm was
sued for fraud for
concealing the
nonperformance of certain
delinquent loans [Pasztor,
1985].
(continued)

8/The

Woman CPA, July, 1987

Berton, Lee, “Accounting Firms Cut Fees,
Steal Clients in Battle for Business,” Wall
Street Journal (September 20, 1985a), p.
1.
Berton, Lee, “As Accounting Firms’ Premi
ums Soar, Some Might Drop Liability Insur
ance,” Wall Street Journal (May 30,1985b),
p. 17.
Berton, Lee, "One-Third of GovernmentGrant Audits by Accountants are Sloppy,
GAO Says,” Wall Street Journal (March
17, 1986a), p. 6.
Berton, Lee, "Ruling Gives Accountants Lia
bility Worry,” Wall Street Journal (Febru
ary 26, 1986b), p. 14.
Brannigan, Martha, “SEC Charges ESM Audi
tor Received Total of $125,000 from Firm’s
Officers,” Wall Street Journal (March 21,
1985), p. 2.
Drinkhall, Jim, “Itel's Problems Were Kept
From Its Board by Peat Marwick, Examin
er’s Study Says,” Wall Street Journal (No
vember 29, 1982), p. 4.
Ibrahim, Mohamed, “An Expectancy Based
Model for Auditors' Choice to FilterReport
ed Time in CPA Firms,” Collected Papers
and Abstracts of the 1986 Southwest AAA
Meeting (1986), pp. 160-167.
Ingersoll, Bruce, “Big Eight Firm and SEC
Settle Digilog Dispute,” Wall Street Jour
nal (November 30, 1984), p. 8.
Ingersoll, Bruce, “Seidman Censured by SEC
for Audit of Chronar Corp.,” Wall Street
Journal (October 11,1985), p. 8.
Ingersoll, Bruceand Lee Berton,“Rare Public
Dispute Between CPA Firms Involves Lia
bility in Brokerage’s Failure,” Wall Street
Journal (March 28, 1985), p. 10.
KellyT., and R. E. Seiber,“Auditorstress and
Time Budgets,” The CPA Journal (Decem
ber 1982), pp. 24-34.
“Metcalf Report,” Senate Committee on Gov
ernmental Operations, Subcommittee on
Reports, Accounting, and Management,
“The Accounting Establishment: A Staff
Study,” S. Doc. 95-34, 95th Congress 1st
Session 35-36, 1979.
News Report, “SEC Issues First Public Report
on Its Activities on Alleged Audit Fail
ures,” Journal of Accountancy (August
1985), p. 10.
Pasztor, Andy, “Justice Department Sues
Peat Marwick, Charging Fraud on Penn
Square Audit,” Wall Street Journal (July 5,
1985), p. 4.
Pound, Edward, "House Panel Assails Regu
lators, Auditor, Ex-Officers of Failed Bev
erly Hills S & L,” Wall Street Journal (July
22, 1985), p. 7.
Stricharchuk, Gregory and Damon Darlin,
“Ernst & Whinney’s Audit of Bank That
Failed Puzzles Investigators,” Wall Street
Journal (November 9, 1982), p. 16.
WSJ Staff, “Arthur Andersen Defrauded Fund,
U.S. Jury Decides,” Wall Street Journal
(November 6, 1981a), p. 24.
WSJ Staff, “Arthur Andersen, Two Viatron
Ex-Aides Held Liable for Claims,” Wall
Street Journal (March 25, 1981 b), p. 40.
WSJ Staff, “California Accountant is Penal
ized in Case Involving Olympic Gas,” Wall
Street Journal (February 18,1983a), p. 50.
WSJ Staff, “Data Access Holders to Receive
$3,250,000 from Touche Ross,” Wall Street
Journal (March 18, 1985a), p. 44.
WSJ Staff, “Leventhal is Censured by SEC
Over Audits for Emerson’s Ltd.,” Wall

TABLE 1
A Partial Listing of
Problem Audits
(continued)

Fox & Co. (1981)

Alpex Computer
Corp.

The CPA firm was censured
by the SEC for performing a
reckless audit. The firm did
not adhere to professional
standards. This resulted in
its failure to discover
material fraudulent
transactions, including
worthless notes and
overvalued real estate
property [Wendell, 1985].

Coopers & Lybrand
(1981-1982)

Digilog Inc.

The SEC charged that the
CPA firm had engaged in
“improper professional
conduct” when it issued a
clean opinion on the client’s
financial statements.
Digilog failed to consolidate
its financial statements with
that of DBS International, a
company controlled by
Digilog. This resulted in a
$1.2 million overstatement
of Digilog's 1982 pre-tax
earnings [Ingersoll, 1984].

Seidman & Seidman
(1983)

Chronar Corp.

The CPA firm was censured
by the SEC for failing to
gather sufficient evidence
to warrant the clean opinion
given. The CPA firm did not
challenge two questionable
transactions that overstated
revenue by $2.7 million
[Ingersoll, 1985].

Numerous CPA firms
(1984)

Government grants

A GAO study asserted that
1/3 of the audits performed
on government grants by
accounting firms in 1984
were sloppy and may
warrant discipline by the
state regulators.
Furthermore, many
accountants conceded that
their audits of U.S. grants
were inadequate [Berton,
1986a].

Touche Ross & Co.
(1984)

Beverly Hills Savings The CPA firm helped its
failing client restructure
& Loan
some of its ailing
investment projects into
equity-participation loans.
This allowed the client to
accrue interest on these
loans and was a highly
questionable accounting
practice [Pound, 1985].
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